White Collar Overcriminalization: Deterrence, Plea Bargaining, and the Loss of Innocence by Dervan, Lucian E.
Kentucky Law Journal
Volume 101 | Issue 4 Article 3
2013
White Collar Overcriminalization: Deterrence,
Plea Bargaining, and the Loss of Innocence
Lucian E. Dervan
Southern Illinois University School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj
Part of the Criminal Law Commons
Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits
you.
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been accepted for inclusion in Kentucky Law Journal
by an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.
Recommended Citation
Dervan, Lucian E. (2013) "White Collar Overcriminalization: Deterrence, Plea Bargaining, and the Loss of Innocence," Kentucky Law
Journal: Vol. 101 : Iss. 4 , Article 3.
Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj/vol101/iss4/3
White Collar Overcriminalization:
Deterrence, Plea Bargaining, and the Loss of
Innocence
Professor Lucian E. Dervan'
INTRODUCTION
O vercriminalization takes many forms and impacts the American
criminal justice system in varying ways.' This article focuses on a select
portion of this phenomenon by examining two types of overcriminalization
prevalent in white collar criminal law. The first type of overcriminalization
discussed in this article is Congress's propensity for increasing the maximum
criminal penalties for white collar offenses in an effort to punish financial
criminals more harshly while simultaneously deterring others. The second
type of overcriminalization addressed is Congress's tendency to create
vague and overlapping criminal provisions in areas already criminalized in
I Assistant Professor of Law, Southern Illinois University School of Law, and former
member of the King & Spalding LLP Special Matters and Government Investigations Team.
Special thanks to Professors Ellen Podgor, Roger Fairfax, Susan Klein, Peter Henning, John
Hasnas, Elizabeth Megale, Miriam Baer, and Sharon Davies and to Norman Reimer and Brian
Walsh. Thanks also to my research assistants, Elizabeth Boratto and Brian Lee, for their work
on this article.
2 [The trend of overcriminalization] takes many forms, but most frequently
occurs through:
(i) enacting criminal statutes absent meaningful mens rea requirements; (ii)
imposing vicarious liability for the acts of others with insufficient evidence of
personal awareness or neglect; (iii) expanding criminal law into economic activity
and areas of the law traditionally reserved for regulatory and civil enforcement
agencies; (iv) creating mandatory minimum sentences thatfailto reflect actual culpability;
(v) federalizing crimes traditionally reserved for state jurisdiction; and (vi) adopting
duplicative and overlapping statutes.
Reining in Overcriminalization: Assessing the Problem, Proposing Solutions: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Sec. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, I I ith Cong. 15
(20 10) (written statement ofJim E. Lavine, President, NationalAssociation ofCriminal Defense
Lawyers), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/printers/l I ith/i 1-151_58476.pdf
(emphases added); see BRIAN W. WALSH & TIFFANY M. JOSLYN, WITHOUT INTENT: How CONGRESS
is ERODING THE CRIMINAL INTENT REQUIREMENT IN FEDERAL LAW 5-6 (20 io), availableathttp://
www.nacdlorglWorkArea/linkit.aspx?Linkldentifier=id&ItemID= 17613 (discussing the
already extensive number of federal criminal statutes and Congress's reactionary tendencies
in continuing to pass such legislation); see also Erik Luna, The Overcriminalization Phenomenon,
54 AM. U. L. REV. 703, 704 (2005) ("Over time, however, the United States has experienced
a dramatic enlargement in governmental authority and the breadth of law enforcement
prerogatives.").
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an effort to expand the tools available to prosecutors, increase the number
of financial criminals prosecuted each year, and deter potential offenders.
While these new provisions are not the most egregious examples of the
overcriminalization phenomenon,3 they are important to consider due to
their impact on significant statutes. In fact, they typically represent some
of the most commonly charged offenses in the federal system.
While much has been written about the plethora of negative
consequences resulting from overcriminalization generally,4 it is worth
noting that not everyone believes that the potential negative consequences
of the two types of overcriminalization discussed above outweigh the
potential benefits. First, some argue that repeatedly increasing the statutory
maximums for white collar offenses is justified because doing so means
culpable individuals will receive longer prison sentences reflective of their
conduct, and, in addition, others will be deterred from committing such
crimes.5 Second, some argue that enacting broad new criminal provisions
in areas already criminalized is justified because such enactments
provide prosecutors with the tools necessary to ensure that creative and
sophisticated white collar criminals are brought to justice in larger numbers,
3 Delaware punishes by up to six months imprisonment the sale of perfume
or lotion as a beverage.
In Alabama, it is a felony to maim one's self to "excite sympathy" or to train abear to wrestle, while Nevada criminalizes the disturbance of a congregation at
worship by "engaging in any boisterous or noisy amusement." Tennessee makes it
a misdemeanor to hunt wildlife from an aircraft, Indiana bans the coloring of birds
and rabbits, Massachusetts punishes those who frighten pigeons from their nests,
and Texas declares it a felony to use live animals as lures in dog racing. In turn,
spitting in public spaces is a misdemeanor in Virginia, and anonymously sending
an indecent or "suggestive" message in South Carolina is punishable by up to
three years imprisonment. Not to be outdone, the federal government prohibitsplacing an advertisement on the U.S. flag (or vice versa) within the District of
Columbia, as well as the unauthorized use of the "Red Cross" emblem or the
characters "Smokey Bear" or "Woodsy Owl."
Luna, supra note 2, at 704 (citations omitted).
4 For a discussion of the negative consequences of overcriminalization, see Ellen S.
Podgor, Overcriminalization: The Politics of Crime, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 541 (2005) and accompanying
symposium articles. "[Tlhe common features of overcriminalization include the following: (i)
excessive unchecked discretion in enforcement authorities, (2) inevitable disparity among
similarly situated persons, (3) potential for abuse by enforcement authorities, (4) potential
to undermine other significant values and evade significant procedural protections, and
(5) misdirection of scarce resources (opportunity costs)." Sara Sun Beale, The Many Faces of
Overcriminalization: From Morals and Mattress Tags to Overfederalization, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 747,
749(2005).
5 E.g., Kip Schlegel et al., Are White-Collar Crimes Overcriminalized? Some Evidence on the
Use of Criminal Sanctions Against Securities Violators, 28 W ST. U. L. REV. 117, 134 (2001) (while
not condoning overcriminalization, the author notes that "[olne could assume that at least
one purpose for criminalizing acts and actors is to impose more drastic forms and amounts
of punishment. A logical rationale for the extension of the criminal sanction to economic
activity is the perceived need for more potent deterrents than those offered through a system
of pricing.").
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thereby deterring others from committing similar offenses. 6 This article
seeks to test the accuracy of the underlying premises utilized by both of
these "justifications" for the overcriminalization discussed herein: (a) the
assumption that increasing statutory maximums results in ever-lengthening
sentences for individual white collar defendants and, therefore, acts as a
deterrent; and (b) the assumption that enacting additional laws that are
vague and overlapping in areas already criminalized results in increased
levels of enforcement against white collar criminals and, therefore, acts as
a deterrent.
To analyze the accuracy of these assumptions, this article examines
Congress's "get tough on crime" response to white collar offenses
following the collapse of Enron in 2001. In particular, this article considers
the effect of the two types of overcriminalization discussed above within
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 ("Sarbanes-Oxley" or "Act").7 First,
Congress's propensity for increasing the maximum criminal penalties
will be examined through analysis of the Act's provisions increasing the
maximum penalty for mail and wire fraud from five years to twenty.8 This
article will examine whether these statutory amendments resulted in white
collar criminals receiving dramatically longer prison sentences. Second,
this article considers Congress's tendency to enact vague and overlapping
criminal provisions through analysis of Sarbanes-Oxley's creation of two
new obstruction of justice provisions as compliments to those already in
existence.9 This article will explore whether these new statutory offenses
resulted in a dramatic increase in the number of obstruction of justice
prosecutions. By examining the impact of these reforms, this article seeks
6 See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Paradigms Lost. The Blurring of the Criminal and Civil Law
Models--And What Can be DoneAboutIt, 10 1 YALE L.J. 1875, 1876 (1992) ("The law can deter in
different ways and to different degrees. Borrowing terms coined by Professor Robert Cooter, I
would suggest that in its characteristic operation, the civil law 'prices,' while the criminal law
'sanctions.'The difference between a price and a sanction is at bottom the difference between,
on one hand, a tax that brings private and public costs into balance by forcing the actor to
internalize costs that the actor's conduct imposes on others and, on the other, a significantly
discontinuous increase in the expected cost of the behavior that is intended to dissuade the
actor from engaging in the activity at all."). While the above quotation from Professor Coffee is
not cited to imply he condones overcriminalization, I believe his description of the perceived
deterrent effect of criminalization itself is helpful.
7 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 1 16 Stat. 745 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of II U.S.C., 15 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., and 29 U.S.C.).
8 Infra Part II. Not only have maximum penalties increased, so too has the quantity of
codified offenses. HARVEY A. SILVERGLATE, THREE FELONIES A DAY: How THE FEDS TARGET THE
INNOCENT, at xxxi (2009) (noting that a study by the Federalist Society in 2007 concluded
there were more than 4450 criminal offenses in the U.S. Code, an increase of 1450 since 1980);
Luna, supra note 2, at 713 ("A recent report concluded that the erratic body of federal law has
now swelled to more than four thousand offenses that carry criminal punishment, and other
works have noted similar upsurges in the number of crimes at the state level.").
9 Infra Part II.
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to understand whether new crimes and punishments really achieve their
intended goals and, if not, what this means for the overcriminalization
debate and the overcriminalization "justifications" discussed above.
I. ENRON AND THE ROAD TO SARBANES-OXLEY
The road to Sarbanes-Oxley and a new round of overcriminalization
began with the collapse of Enron in 2001.10 In October of that year,
Enron announced to the world that during the third quarter it would take
charges in excess of one billion dollars due to "soured investments.""
By December 2001, Enron was forced to file bankruptcy, a petition that
admitted the existence of $13.15 billion in company debt, a number that was
overshadowed by an estimated $27 billion in off-balance sheet liabilities. 2
Far from an innocent corporate failure, mounting evidence quickly showed
that the Enron bankruptcy was the result of systemic corruption and fraud
that reached the highest levels of the corporate structure. The complex
fraud that saw the demise of one of America's largest and fastest growing
corporations led the President of the United States to discuss corporate
crime in his 2002 State of the Union address to Congress. "Through
stricter accounting standards and tougher disclosure requirements,"
stated President George W. Bush, "corporate America must be made
more accountable to employees and shareholders and held to the highest
standards of conduct."' 3 Interestingly, both President Bush and Securities
and Exchange Commission Chairman Harvey Pitt argued that the road to
such reforms be advanced through administrative agencies, not through
legislative reform.'4 In testimony before Congress on March 21, 2002,
to See Linda Chatman Thomsen & Donna Norman, Sarbanes-Oxley Turns Six: An
Enforcement Perspective, 3 J. Bus. & TECH. L. 393, 394 (2008) ("The story behind [the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act] begins with the fraud at Enron Corporation, which led to its December 2001 filing
of what was then the largest bankruptcy in U.S. history.").
II HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL, SARBANES-OXLEY IN PERSPECTIVE § 1:I (2012).
12 Id.
13 Id. § 1:2.
14 Id. § I:9. As further support for the proposition that legislative intervention was not
desired by the executive branch, the President released a ten point proposal for responding to
the crisis. Id. § 1:4. None of the ten points requested or required legislative intervention from
Congress. See id. § 1:4. The list requires:
(1) Each investor should have quarterly access to the information needed to judge
a firm's financial performance, condition, and risks; (a) Each investor should have
prompt access to critical information; (3) CEOs should personally vouch for the
veracity, timeliness, and fairness of their companies' public disclosures, including
their financial statements; (4) CEOs or other officers should not be allowed to profit
from erroneous financial statements.; (5) CEOs or other officers who clearly abuse
their power should lose their right to serve in any corporate leadership positions;
(6) Corporate leaders should be required to tell the public promptly whenever
they buy or sell company stock for personal gain; (7) Investors should have
complete confidence in the independence and integrity of companies' auditors; (8)
An independent regulatory board should ensure that the accounting profession is
held to the highest ethical standards; (9) The authors of accounting standards must
[Vol. toi
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Chairman Pitt discussed the administrative reforms being implemented by
the SEC and made clear that legislative action was not necessary.,5
Regardless of the desire of the executive branch to limit the legislative
response to Enron, Congress was anxious to participate in the national
response to Enron. By March 2002, there were over thirty bills in Congress
purporting to address the growing financial crimes epidemic. 6 Perhaps
sensing that congressional intervention was inevitable, President Bush
attempted to refocus Congress's attention by asking for legislation that
would "double the maximum prison terms for those convicted of financial
fraud from five to 10 years."' 7 Presumably, the President and many others
believed that increasing the maximum punishments available for white
collar criminals under federal statutes would lead to dramatically longer
sentences for those convicted and, as a result, establish a greater deterrence
to those considering similar conduct."8
On July 20, 2002, President Bush signed Sarbanes-Oxley into law. 9
While the bill contained much more than the President had requested,
this article will focus on just two of the legislative enactments contained
in the Act: (a) the increase in the maximum prison sentences for financial
be responsive to the needs of investors;(io) Firms' accounting systems should be
compared with best practices, not simply against minimum standards.
Id. Further, on June 17, 2002, SEC Chairman Pitt reported to the President regarding the
progress that had been made on each of the ten points. Id. In this letter response, no mention
was made of a desire or need for legislative reform in addressing the crisis. See id.
15 Id. § 1:9.
16 Id.; see also Beale, supra note 4, at 755-56 ("[Federal criminal law] contains what
some have called the crime dujour-legislation drafted in response to whatever crime is the
focal point in the media-even if that offense is already defined and punished harshly and
effectively under state law. For example, a high profile carjacking in a suburb near Washington,
D.C., led to the rapid enactment of a federal carjacking statute. The passage of the federal
law was not a response to any gap in either state law or the state enforcement system: the
perpetrators of the publicized offense were apprehended, convicted, and sentenced to life
imprisonment for murder.").
17 See BLOOMENTHAL, supra note i I, § Io:i.
I8 For a discussion of the various statements made by politicians, law enforcement
personnel, and scholars regarding the predictive impact of Sarbanes-Oxley in lengthening
prison sentences for white collar defendants, see Lucian E. Dervan, Plea Bargaining's Survival:
Financial Crimes Plea Bargaining, a Continued Triumph in a Post-Enron World, 60 OKLA. L. REV.
451, 453-67 (2007). "By creating new laws and amending old fraud provisions, [Sarbanes-
Oxley] took aim at all financial crimes in an effort to increase prosecutions and prison
sentences for an enormous class of defendants, not just the limited number of officers and
directors involved in the major scandals of the day." Id. at 455.
19 Sarbanes-OxleyAct of 2oo2, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 1 i6 Stat. 745 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of i i U.S.C., 15 U.S.C., I8 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., and 29 U.S.C.). For further
discussion on the legislative process that accompanied the creation and passage of Sarbanes-
Oxley, see Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate
Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521 (2005); Ann Marie Tracey & Paul Fiorelli, Nothing Concentrates
the Mind Like the Prospect of a Hanging. The Criminalization of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 25 N. ILL.
U. L. REv. 125 (2004).
20][2-20131
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criminals, and (b) the addition of two new obstruction of justice provisions
in Title 18 of the U.S. Code.
First, the President requested that white collar criminals be punished
more harshly in response to the corporate frauds of 2001 and 2002.20 Congress
not only granted the President's request, but went above and beyond his
specific proposal with regard to two of the most commonly charged white
collar offenses: mail and wire fraud.2 1 Prior to Sarbanes-Oxley, mail and
wire fraud each carried a maximum sentence of five years in prison.2 2
Under Section 903 of Sarbanes-Oxley, the maximum punishment for each
offense was increased to twenty years in prison.2 3 Echoing the President's
and Congress's belief that these amendments would significantly impact
sentences, Attorney General John Ashcroft proclaimed in July 2002 that
"executives and companies face tough penalties including longer jail
sentences for individuals.'2 4 Deputy Attorney General Larry Thompson
repeated these sentiments several months later:
[T]hese [financial] crimes are particularly pernicious and
appropriately the subject of intense-and that is what they are
getting-law enforcement focus and action.... Our goal is to
separate the offenders from law-abiding companies. In many
cases, that separation will be physical and for an extended term of
years.25
The question to be addressed herein is whether the changes to the
maximum punishments available for mail and wire fraud actually had the
desired result of dramatically increasing the average prison sentences of
individual white collar defendants and, if so, whether such increases could
effectively deter future criminal conduct.
Second, Congress's response to the corporate scandals in 2001 and 2002
involved more than increasing the available punishments for white collar
criminals. As observed by one scholar, "Congress did not simply increase
penalties [in Sarbanes-Oxley]. Congress also plugged some gaps in existing
law, made proof requirements easier on prosecutors, and embraced as
20 See BLOOMENTHAL,Supra note i i, § I0:I.
21 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (zo); 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2012).
22 Dervan, supra note 18, at 455.
23 Pub. L. No. I07-204, § 903(a)-(b), ii6 Stat. 745, 805 (2002); see also Thomsen &
Norman, supra note io, at 399 ("For individuals, [Sarbanes-Oxley] extended the maximum
jail terms for securities violations from ten to twenty years and increased the maximum fines
from $i million to $5 million.").
24 Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Attorney Gen. Statement on Corp. Responsibility and
the Creation of the Corp Fraud Task Force (July 9, 2002) (emphasis added), available at http://
www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2oo2/July/o2ag__388.htm.
25 Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Attorney Gen., A Day with Justice (Oct. 28, 2002),
available at http://www.justice.gov/archive/dag/speeches/2002llo28odaywithjustice.htm
(emphasis added).
[Vol. IOI
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criminal a wider range of behavior." 6 One such example is the expansion of
obstruction of justice laws. Prior to the enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley, Title
18 of the U.S. Code contained several obstruction of justice provisions,
including 18 U.S.C. §§ 1503 (Influencing or injuring officer or juror generally),
1505 (Obstruction of proceedings before departments, agencies, and committees),
and 1512(b) (Tampering with a witness, victim, or an informant).,7 Despite
the existence of these various obstruction of justice provisions, Congress
determined in the aftermath of Enron that additional laws were necessary.
According to one Senate Report, statutory changes were necessary in this
already criminalized area to ensure that "when a person destroys evidence
with the intent of obstructing any type of investigation and the matter is
within the jurisdiction of a federal agency, overly technical distinctions
[will] neither hinder nor prevent prosecution and punishment.""8 As
such, Congress passed, and the President signed, Sarbanes-Oxley, which
contained two new obstruction of justice statutes.2 9
The first new obstruction of justice provision was 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c):
Whoever corruptly--(1) alters, destroys, mutilates, or conceals
a record, document, or other object, or attempts to do so, with
the intent to impair the object's integrity or availability for use
in an official proceeding; or (2) otherwise obstructs, influences,
or impedes any official proceeding, or attempts to do so, shall
be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years,
or both.
30
18 U.S.C. § 1512(c) is similar to 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b), but is broader in scope
because it reaches beyond the conduct of managerial agents and applies to
anyone who engages in document destruction.3
26 Tracey & Fiorelli, supra note I9, at 135.
27 i8 U.S.C. §§ 1503, 1505, 1512(b) (2012).
28 S. REP. No. 107-146, at 7 (2002).
29 See 148 CONG. REC. S74 8 (daily ed. July 26, 2002) (statement of Sen. Patrick
Leahy) (discussing that with Sarbanes-Oxley, Congress sought to "clarify and plug holes
in the current criminal laws relating to the destruction or fabrication of evidence and the
preservation of financial and audit records."); see also Tracey & Fiorelli, supra note 19, at 133
("Recent business scandals, such as those referenced herein, did not occur in a legislative
environment that condoned such activity. To the contrary, many federal laws addressed and
prohibited conduct occurring in these scenarios, such as obstruction of justice, intimidating
witnesses, destroying evidence, and various types of fraudulent activity.").
30 18 U.S.C. § I512(C) (2012).
31 Gary G. Grindler & Jason A. Jones, Please Step Away from the Shredder and the "Delete"
Key: §§ 802 and 1102 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 67, 78 (2004).
This new subsection to § 1512 essentially duplicates § 1512(b)(2)(B), with a few
significant changes. First, the new subsection eliminates reference to persuasion,
intimidation, or threat, thus reaching beyond the conduct of those in supervisory
roles and subjecting the individual shredder to criminal penalties. Second, the new
subsection adds language specifically referring to documents and records. Finally,
it increases the statutory maximum penalty from i0 to 2o years, in line with the
penalty provision of § 1519.
2OI[2-2013]
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The second new obstruction of justice provision was 18 U.S.C. § 1519:
Whoever knowingly alters, destroys, mutilates, conceals, covers
up, falsifies, or makes a false entry in any record, document, or
tangible object with the intent to impede, obstruct, or influence
the investigation or proper administration of any matter within
the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United
States or any case filed under title 11, or in relation to or
contemplation of any such matter or case, shall be fined under
this title, imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both.3"
18 U.S.C. § 1519 is particularly broad and was created in hopes of providing
prosecutors the ability to bring charges against a more expansive group
of potential defendants, thereby increasing the number of white collar
prosecutions each year.33 Senator Patrick Leahy, an architect of the
Sarbanes-Oxley criminal provisions, stated that 18 U.S.C. § 1519 "is meant
to apply broadly to any acts to destroy or fabricate physical evidence so
long as they are done with the intent to obstruct, impede, or influence the
investigation" of a matter within the jurisdiction of the United States.34 As
with the mail and wire fraud amendments in Sarbanes-Oxley the question
to be addressed herein is whether the new and overlapping obstruction of
justice provisions in this already criminalized area had the desired result of
dramatically increasing the number of white collar defendants prosecuted
in subsequent years and whether such increased enforcement could
effectively deter future criminal conduct.
1I. THE TRUE IMPACT OF SARBANES-OXLEY ON WHITE COLLAR CASES
A. Analysis of the Harsher Punishments Justification for Overcriminalization
The first "justification" advanced by some for ignoring the negative
consequences flowing from Sarbanes-Oxley's overcriminalization measures
is that an increase in the statutory maximum sentences for mail and
wire fraud will result in dramatically harsher punishments for individual
criminals, creating a strong deterrent effect for others.35 The Bureau of
Id.
32 18 U.S.C. § 1519 (2012).
33 See 148 CONG. REC. S7419 (daily ed. July 26, 2002) (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy)
(characterizing § 1519 as "a new general anti shredding provision").
34 Id.
35 See supra INTRODUCTION; see also Schlegel et al., supra note 5, at I 19 ("In spite of
the attention directed toward overcriminalization, very little empirical evidence has been
produced to actually demonstrate that these initiatives and reforms have resulted in a
toughened posture against business malfeasance.").
[Vol. IOI
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Justice Statistics maintains records regarding the mean length of sentence
for defendants convicted of mail and wire fraud by year.36
Graph A:
Mean Length of Sentence (in months) for Defendants Convicted
of Mail and Wire Fraud Offenses
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As Graph A indicates, the mean sentences for defendants convicted of
mail and wire fraud have risen significantly since 2002, the year in which
the Sarbanes-Oxley amendments took effect. In particular, between 2002
and 2010, the mean sentence for mail fraud increased by eighteen months,
while the mean sentence for wire fraud increased by ten months. These
upward shifts alone, however, might not support the general proposition
that the congressional enactments increasing the statutory maximums had
the intended effects.
First, while the mean sentence for a defendant convicted of mail or
wire fraud is now between forty-two and seventy-eight percent higher
than in 2002, it is important to observe that these increases are still much
less than the 400% increase in the statutory maximums enacted.37 Further,
mean sentences for mail and wire fraud continue to remain significantly
lower than the pre-2002 statutory maximum of five years in prison. Second,
rather than reflecting a broad shift in sentences for all mail and 'wire fraud
defendants, it is possible that the elevated mean sentences observed above
are the result of a skewing effect due to a handful of enormous sentences
imposed on defendants who engaged in large frauds. For instance, Bernard
Madoff, the infamous ponzi-schemer convicted of mail and wire fraud, was
36 See Federal Criminal Case Processing Statistics, BUREAU JUST. STAT., http://bjs.gov/fjsre/
(last visited Apr. 12, 2013).
37 See BLOOMENTHAL, supra note i i, § to: i; see also Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L.
No. 107-204, § 903, 1 16 Stat. 745, 8o5.
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sentenced to 150 years in prison in 2009.38 Utilizing available data regarding
the number of mail and wire fraud convictions in 2009, Madoff's single
sentence could increase the mean incarceration period for mail and wire
fraud that year by over three months.39 As such, it is likely that a handful
of defendants in the years following the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley could
be wholly responsible for the rise in mean sentences. Finally, one might
argue that raising the statutory maximum for mail and wire fraud was at
least necessary to sentence the most culpable white collar defendants to
prison terms in excess of five years. However, because it is not necessary to
increase the statutory maximums to sentence particularly egregious white
collar criminals to staggering prison terms, this argument fails. Consider the
case of Jeffrey Skilling, who was convicted based on statutes passed prior to
Sarbanes-Oxley. By using consecutive sentencing rather than concurrent
sentencing, the court was able to impose a term of 292 months-almost
twenty-five years-in prison,4° a term well in excess of even today's
statutory maximum sentences for mail or wire fraud.
The hypothesis that Sarbanes-Oxley may not be responsible, at least
in a significant manner, for the increase in mean mail and wire fraud
sentences witnessed after 2002 appears to be supported by examination
of the median sentences for fraud defendants in the federal system during
the same time period.
38 United States v. Bernard L. MadoffandRelatedCases, JusTCE.Gov, http://www.justice.
gov/usao/nys/madoff.html (last visited Apr. 12, 2013).
39 In 2009, io62 wire and mail fraud cases were closed in the federal system (556 mail
fraud cases and 506 wire fraud cases). The mean sentence for these defendants was 37.07
months for mail fraud and 41.1 months for wire fraud. Assuming mail and wire fraud were
considered the most significant charges in the case for Bureau of Justice Statistics reporting
purposes, if Bernard Madoff were removed from this group of defendants, the mean sentence
for the remaining defendants would decrease to 33.89 months for mail fraud and 37.61 months
for wire fraud, a drop of 3.17 months and 3.48 months, respectively. See BUREAU JUST. STAT.,
supra note 36.
40 See Laurel Brubaker Calkins & Thom Weidlich, Skilling May Stay in Prison Even if
He Wins Appeal (Update3), BLOOMBERG (Apr. 2, 2008, 10:53 EDT), http://www.bloomberg.
com/apps/news? pid=newsarchive&sid=aDf5bJG8hbEo&refer=us ("U.S. District Judge Sim
Lake sentenced Skilling to IO years on each of two securities-fraud counts, to be served
consecutively. He sentenced Skilling to an additional 52 months on each of the remaining 17
counts, to be served simultaneously after both io--year sentences were completed.").
[Vol. IOI
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Graph B:
Median Sentence (in months) for Federal Defendants
Convicted of Fraud Offenses
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As demonstrated in Graph B, the median sentence for federal defendants
convicted of fraud increased from eight months in 2002 to ten months in
2009 and twelve months in 2012. This represents a mere two-to-four month
increase and is certainly not what was expected or desired in the wake of
the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley.4" Further, in 2004 and part of 2005, the
median sentence for fraud actually dropped to its lowest level in decades.
Finally, with regard to the relatively small observed increase in median
sentences, it is also worth considering whether factors other than Sarbanes-
Oxley led to these increases. For instance, the United States Sentencing
Commission increased the base offense level for many fraud offenses from
six to seven points in 2002 .41 This amendment alone subjected defendants
to a roughly ten percent increase in their sentences .43 Applying this
increase to post-2002 sentencing suggests that this guidelines reform may
41 See Press Release, Dep't of Justice, supra note 24 (discussing the White House's vision
for deterring corporate fraud by imposing tough penalties).
42 See Dervan, supra note 18, at 459-62.
43 Frank 0. Bowman, 111, Pour Encourager Les Autres? The Curious History and Distressing
Implications of the Criminal Provisions of the Sarbanes-Ox1ley Act and the Sentencing Guidelines
Amendments thatFollowed, I OHIO ST. J. CR1M. L0 373,433 (2004).
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account for most of the increases to median sentences described above, not
Sarbanes-Oxley. 4
The above data suggest that average sentences have not risen
dramatically as a direct result of the increases in statutory maximums
found in Sarbanes-Oxley.45 As such, the data suggests that the primary
"justification" offered in defense of this type of overcriminalization-that
it leads to harsher penalties reflective of financial criminals' culpability-
may be based on a false assumption regarding the impact of such legislative
action on the sentences of individual defendants. 46
B. Analysis of the Increased Prosecutions Justification for Overcriminalization
The second "justification" some commentators advance for ignoring
the negative consequences that naturally flow from the overcriminalization
contained in Sarbanes-Oxley is that expanding prosecutors' arsenal in
already criminalized areas leads to more prosecutions. To begin the analysis
of the accuracy of this assumption, Graph C illustrates the percentage of
offenders in the federal system for whom the primary offense category was
"Administration of Justice," which includes obstruction of justice crimes. 47
44 See id. As to the effect of the increase of base level, Bowman notes:
[T/hough a one-base-offense-level increase may seem insignificant, it actually
has profound effects on thousands of individual defendants. It bumps up the
sentencing range of every federal fraud defendant by one level, thus increasing the
minimum guideline sentence of defendants subject to imprisonment by roughly
ten percent. Even more importantly, it limits judicial choice of sentence type in four
out of ten fraud cases prosecuted in federal court.
Id.
45 While this article concludes that average sentences for fraud defendants have likely
not risen dramatically since 2002 as a direct result of Sarbanes-Oxley, it is clear that sentences
for the most notorious white collar defendants have increased over the years. In fact, as
Professor Ellen Podgor notes in her article regarding white collar sentencing after Enron, such
defendants face significant prison time today compared to the pre-Enron period. Specifically,
Podgor states,
White collar offenders in the United States have faced sentences far beyond those
imposed in prior years. For example, Bernard Ebbers, former CEO of WorldCom,
was sentenced to twenty-five years; Jeffrey Skilling, former CEO of Enron, was
sentenced to twenty-four years and four months; and Adelphia founder John Rigas
received a sentence of fifteen years, with his son Timothy Rigas, the CFO of the
company, receiving a twenty-year sentence.
Ellen S. Podgor, Criminal Law: The Challenge of White Collar Sentencing, 97 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 731, 73 1-32 (2007) (footnotes omitted).
46 Id. Podgor's article does not address the impact of overcriminalization that includes
mandatory-minimum sentencing.
47 Examples of "Administration of Justice" offenses include "commission of offense
while on release, bribery of a witness, failure to appear by offender, contempt, failure to appear
by material witness, obstruction ofjustice, payment of witness, perjury or subornation of perjury,
misprision of a felony, and accessory after the fact." 2010 Sourcebook of Federal Sentencing
Statistics, U.S. SENT'G COMM'N, http://www.ussc.gov/Data-and-Statistics/Annual-Reports-
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Graph C:
Percent of Defendants in the Federal System for whom Administration of
Justice was the Primary Offense Category
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As illustrated in Graph C, the federal government's focus on
administration of justice offenses actually decreased after the passage of
Sarbanes-Oxley. After reaching a high of 1.8% of all federal prosecutions in
2001, these prosecutions began steadily declining and currently rest at only
1.4% of all federal prosecutions. At the very least, this likely demonstrates
a reduction in focus and asset allocation by the federal government.
Nevertheless, it is difficult to ascertain what this means for obstruction of
justice prosecutions specifically. Due to the collection of data by the Bureau
of Justice Statistics, however, one can focus more precisely on Sarbanes-
Oxley's impact on obstruction of justice cases.
andSoureebooks/2o12/AppendixA.pdf app. A (last visited Apr. 12, 2013) (emphasis added).
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Graph D:
Total Number of Defendants in Obstruction Cases
Filed by Year and Statutory Provision
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Several interesting patterns emerge from the statistical information
above regarding prosecutions in which obstruction of justice was the
most serious charge.4" To begin, the total number of prosecutions did
increase after Sarbanes-Oxley. In 2002, there were 129 obstruction of
justice prosecutions using the three pre-existing obstruction statutes,
18 U.S.C. §§ 1503, 1505, and 1512(b). This number then increased to an
average of 182 prosecutions a year using the three preexisting obstruction
of justice statutes plus the two new provisions, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1512(c) and
1519. This represents an increase of fifty-three prosecutions a year, which
is just over a forty percent increase. Viewed in isolation, the addition of
two new broad obstruction of justice statutes appears to have succeeded
in increasing the number of prosecutions in this area. Viewed in totality,
though, the addition of only fifty-three prosecutions a year since the two
new statutes' creation is underwhelming, and a far weaker result than the
48 According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics website, "All [offense specific] statistics
refer to defendant-cases where the statute in question was the most serious charge involved."
See Bureau of Justice Statistics, How to Generate Statistics, available at http://www.bjs.gov/
tjsrc/index.cfm?p=help&topic=TSEC-HOW (last visited May 17, 2013). Recognizing this
limitation in the above dataset, future research should be conducted to examine the number
of obstruction of justice convictions where the obstruction charge was not the "most serious
charge involved." Such an analysis should examine whether a more dynamic increase in
convictions occurred in this subset of obstruction cases after the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley
and, if so, why the new obstruction statutes were more effectively utilized in those cases and
whether obstruction convictions had any significant impact on sentence length in those cases.
0
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legislature appears to have intended. 49 Consider, for instance, that in the
same time period the total number of federal prosecutions per year grew
by over 13,000. Further, note that as the number of prosecutions under
18 U.S.C. §§ 1512(c) and 1519 grew, the number of prosecutions applying
the older, more burdensome provisions dropped. This implies that rather
than bringing significant additional prosecutions using their newer and
broader tools, prosecutors may simply have applied the Sarbanes-Oxley
provisions to defendants who would previously have been indicted under
the old provisions. If this is the case, it is likely because, as compared to the
pre-existing obstruction of justice statutes, the new provisions were easier
to prove and contained lower burdens of proof.
Returning to the data regarding the number of prosecutions for
administration of justice violations, it also appears questionable whether
the above-described increase in obstruction of justice prosecutions since
2002 was even the result of the passage of the new Sarbanes-Oxley
obstruction of justice statutes.5 0
Graph E:
Percent Increase in Number of Cases
Per Year Compared to Number of Cases in 1996
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49 See Grindler & Jones, supra note 31, at 78 (citing 148 CONG. REc. S7418-19 (daily ed.
July 26, 2002) (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy)).
50 Data regarding the percentage change in prosecutions for administration of justice
offenses were utilized in Graph E instead of data regarding the percentage change in
prosecutions for obstruction of justice. This was done because of the limited number of
obstruction of justice cases each year as compared to the number of cases in the other data-
sets within this particular graph.
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Graph E presents data regarding the percentage change in the number
of cases brought by the federal government each year in comparison to
the number of cases brought in 1996. As illustrated by the graph, the total
number of prosecutions has grown steadily over the past fifteen years.
Interestingly, the total number of prosecutions by the federal government
has risen at almost twice the rate of administration ofjustice prosecutions. It
is worth noting that immigration offenses increased exponentially over the
past decade and may have skewed the data set; removing these offenses,
variations in obstruction of justice prosecutions essentially tracked federal
prosecutions as a whole. As broader forces drove the absolute number
of prosecutions in all categories higher over the past decade, therefore,
administration of justice prosecutions merely kept pace.
This data suggests that obstruction of justice offenses did not see a
dramatic surge in focus as a result of the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley.
Further, though there was an increase in the absolute number of
prosecutions, Congress's desire for a striking increase in the volume of
obstruction of justice cases appears to have gone unfulfilled. This once
again indicates that the primary "justification" offered in defense of this
type of overcriminalization-that it leads to a meaningful increase in
prosecutions-may be based on a false assumption.5'
III. THE GOAL OF DETERRENCE
The above analysis suggests that the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley was
largely unsuccessful in achieving its two primary goals of dramatically
increasing white collar defendants' sentences and significantly increasing
the number of obstruction of justice cases. However, there was an
observable increase in both the mean sentence for mail and wire fraud and
the absolute number of obstruction of justice prosecutions.5 To the extent
that any of this growth was attributable to the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley,
it is worth considering whether the observable increases could have then
led to the ultimate legislative goal of deterring future criminality in these
enforcement areas.
51 This article does not suggest that the last century's proliferation of federal statutes did
not impact the federal government's ability to charge defendants who would previously have
been outside the scope of federal jurisdiction, or that overcriminalization more broadly does
not contribute to the increase in America's prison population. Rather, this article seeks only to
address the impact of creating similar and overlapping statutes in an already criminalized area,
such as what occurred with regard to obstruction of justice offenses-not the creation of laws
in a previously uncriminalized field.
52 See supra Graphs A, D.
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The issue of deterrence has fascinated criminologists and legal scholars
alike for decades.53 As a result, there is a deep body of research examining
the effectiveness of varying strategies on deterring future criminality. A
review of these pieces clearly indicates that increasing sentencing severity,
particularly where the offense is already punished with imprisonment,
is ineffective at deterring others from taking a similar course.MA 1999
comprehensive review of research regarding the deterrent effect of
increases in sentences by the Institute of Criminology at Cambridge
University provides support for the conclusion that increasing the severity
of sentences does not enhances deterrent effects.55 Further, a recent review
of literature on the subject by Paul Robinson & John Darley published in
the OxfordJournal ofLegal Studies is consistent with this view. 6 In particular,
with regard to increasing sentencing schemes for offenses:
[Tihe behavioral sciences increasingly call into question the
assumption of criminal law's ex ante influence on conduct.
Potential offenders commonly do not know the legal rules, either
directly or indirectly, even those rules that have been explicitly
formulated to produce a behavioural effect. Even if they know
the rules, the cost-benefit analysis potential offenders perceive
... commonly leads to a conclusion suggesting violation rather
than compliance, either because the perceived likelihood of
punishment is so small, or because it is so distant as to be highly
discounted, or for a variety of other or a combination of reasons.
And, even if they know the legal rules and perceive a cost-benefit
analysis that urges compliance, potential offenders commonly
cannot or will not bring such knowledge to bear to guide their
conduct in their own best interests, such failure stemming from
a variety of social, situational, or chemical influences.57
Interestingly, studies in the same field indicate that the likelihood of
apprehension and conviction does deter criminal behavior in a way that
53 See, e.g., Anthony N. Doob & Cheryl Marie Webster, Sentence Severvty and Crime:
Accepting the Null Hypothesis, 30 CRIME & JUST. 143 (2003) (examining various studies of the
topic).
54 See Paul R. Robinson & John M. Darley, Does Criminal Law Deter? A Behavioral Science
Investigation, 24 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 173 (2004). ("Having a criminal justice system that
imposes sanctions no doubt does deter criminal conduct. But available social science research
suggests that manipulating criminal law rules within that system to achieve heightened
deterrence effects generally will be ineffective."). Id. at 173
55 See ANDREW VON HIRSH ET AL., CRIMINAL DETERRENCE AND SENTENCE SEVERITY: AN
ANALYSIS OF RECENT RESEARCH 45 (i999); see also Miriam H. Baer, Linkage and the Deterrence
of Corporate Fraud, 94 VA. L. REV. 1295, 13o6 (2008) ("In light of discounts and the declining
disutility of sanctions, numerous neoclassical accounts of deterrence support policies that
increase the likelihood rather than the severity of the sanction.").
56 Id.
57 Id. at 174; see also Doob & Webster, supra note 53, at 154 (noting that the proposition
that differential sentencing severity does not affect crime is "widely accepted among
criminologists").
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increasing sentencing severity does not. Professors Daniel Nagin and Greg
Pogarsky, leaders in the field of deterrence research, state, "[P]unishment
certainty is far more consistently found to deter crime than punishment
severity .... -58 In describing this phenomenon in the context of the
American criminal justice system, Paul Robinson and John Darley, also
prominent scholars in the deterrence field, contend that there is reason for
concern:
Research has been done that varies the likelihood of punishment
from its being certain-that is, punishment following every
transgression-to a likelihood of only a probability of 0.1
per cent. For subjects at a 50 per cent punishment rate, the
punishment considerably decreased the subsequent response
rate, by approximately 30 per cent, from the no-punishment
rate. But at a 10 per cent punishment rate, almost no suppression
was observed. This suggests that the response rate will be fairly
sensitive to a drop off in the punishment rate.59
Given that only an estimated 1.3% of criminal offenses committed each
year in the United States result in prosecution and conviction, Robinson
and Darley note that "these low rates of conviction and punishment will
have a seriously damaging effect on deterrent effect of the threatened
punishment. 60
The above research indicates that Congress was on both the right and
the wrong path when it passed the Sarbanes-Oxley reforms in hopes of
deterring future criminality. The increased statutory maximums for mail
and wire fraud were intended to dramatically increase sentences for white
collar offenders to deter others contemplating similar schemes. 61 While
the dramatic increase in sentences sought by President Bush and others
did not occur, fraud sentences did increase during the 2000s. 62 Whether
the resulting sentencing increases were small or large, however, appears
irrelevant to the deterrence question, because neither would have achieved
this goal. As noted above, increasing sentences, particularly where the
conduct is already criminalized, does not decrease the occurrence of the
offense.63
With regard to white collar offenders, there are several reasons this might
be true. First, white collar offenders are unlikely to know that the mail and
58 Daniel S. Nagin & Greg Pogarsky, Integrating Celerity, Impulsivity, and Extralegal
Sanction Threats into a Model of General Deterrence: Theory and Evidence, 39 CRIMINOLOGY 865,
865 (2001).
59 See Robinson & Darley, supra note 54, at 183.
60 Id. at 184 (noting that the public perceives the prosecution and conviction rate as
higher, while certain criminals overestimate their ability to go undetected).
61 See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
62 See supra Graph A and accompanying text.
63 See supra Graph D and accompanying text.
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wire fraud statutes exist, let alone the applicable statutory maximum of
each.' Second, even if white collar offenders did acquire this legal acumen,
they would likely ignore the risks, given the significant financial benefits
of economic crime in comparison to the distant and relatively minimal
chance of detection.6" One might even argue that white collar offenders are
particularly susceptible to a belief that they will not be detected because of
the often sophisticated nature of their offenses. Finally, even if such a risk-
reward analysis did not weigh in favor of criminality, it is likely that those
contemplating economic crimes would proceed regardless, either because
the offense is easy given their positions of trust or because they cannot
control their behavior as a result of addiction or mental illness. In sum, it
appears Congress was both misguided and unsuccessful in its attempt to
use increased punishments as a means of achieving greater deterrence.
Congress's decision to increase the number of available obstruction of
justice offenses may have proven more effective in increasing deterrence.
As described in the analysis of the impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley
amendments, the number of obstruction of justice prosecutions following
passage of the reforms increased by over forty percent.'6 This significant
percentage increase might be perceived as dramatically increasing the
likelihood that one will be prosecuted for such conduct. 67 While increasing
sentences does not deter criminality, increasing the likelihood of detection
and prosecution measurably impacts offense rates. 68 While this indicates
Congress was on the right path with this particular reform, the execution
was likely insufficient to actually result in increased deterrence. When
the percentages are stripped away, the reality is that there are very few
obstruction of justice prosecutions each year.69 Following the passage of
Sarbanes-Oxley, there was only an average of 182 prosecutions per year
in which obstruction of justice was the most serious offense charged.70
64 See John M. Darley et al., The Ex Ante Function of the Criminal Law, 35 LAW & Soc''
REV. 165, 174-81 (2001) (concluding that most people are unaware of the actual content of
important state statutes); see also Robinson & Darley, supra note 54, at 174.
65 See Robert Lenzner, The Shaine Of It All: Bernie Aladoff Redistributes $65 Billion, FORBES.
com (Mar. 13, 2oo9, 8:oo PM), http://www.forbes.com/2009/o3/13/bernie-madoff-fraud-
personal-finance-financial-advisor-network-ponzi-scheme.htm; Bob Van Voris, Ex-Tyco
CEO Kozlowski Isn't Eligiblefor Millions in Benefits, Judge Rules, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 2, 2010, 9:56
AM), http://wwwv.bloomberg.com/news/2o 10-I 2-02/ex-tyco-ceo-kozlowski-isn-t-cligible-
for-millions-in-benefits-judge-rules.html; see also Robinson & Darley, supra note 54, at 174
("[E]ven if [criminals] know the legal rules and perceive a cost-benefit analysis that urges
compliance, potential offenders commonly cannot or will not bring such knowledge to bear to
guide their conduct in their own best interests, such failure stemming from a variety of social,
situational, or chemical influences.").
66 See supra Graph D and accompanying text.
67 See Robinson & Darley, supra note 54, at 183.
68 See Nagin & Pogarsky, supra note 58, at 865.
69 See supra Part II.
70 See supra Graph D and accompanying text.
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While this was significantly more than during the period before 2002,
this is hardly a number that will convince potential offenders that the
risk of apprehension outweighs the potential gains from their conduct.71
While Congress may have intended a much larger increase in focus on
obstruction offenses, such focus did not materialize; consequently, these
reforms are unlikely to yield substantial results. If Congress truly wanted to
deter obstruction of justice offenses, it should have dramatically increased
funding for law enforcement focus and casework in this area, rather than
turning to overcriminalization once again.7"
IV. THE ELUSIVE GAINS AND DEFINITIVE CONSEQUENCES OF
OVERCRIMINALIZATION
Analysis of the data flowing from prosecutions after the passage of
Sarbanes-Oxley in 2002 demonstrates that few of the intended benefits
have materialized. Sentences for wire and mail fraud increased only slightly
when compared to the calls for reform by President George H. W. Bush
and the fourfold increase in the prescribed statutory maximums enacted. 73
Further, on average, only fifty-three more prosecutions in which obstruction
of justice is the most serious offense occur each year, despite the creation
of two more broadly applicable federal statutes. 74 Finally, the research
regarding deterrence suggests that Sarbanes-Oxley's focus on increasing
sentences and creating new laws was not conducive to its ultimate goal of
deterring future criminality. To better understand why Congress failed in
achieving its goals, one must consider a mechanism from the trenches of
our criminal justice system-plea bargaining.75
71 See Robinson & Darley, supra note 54, at 182-84.
72 See Doob & Webster, supra note 53, at 191 ("Deterrence-based sentencing makes
false promises to the community. As long as the public believes that crime can be deterred by
legislatures or judges through harsh sentences, there is no need to consider other approaches
to crime reduction."). "Overcriminalization" refers to the claim that governments create too
many crimes, including crimes that are duplicative and overlapping, crimes that are vague and
overly broad, and crimes that lack sufficient mens rea to protect innocent conduct. See Hearing
on Stolen or Counterfeit Goods Legislation Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland
Security of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, I t 2th Cong. 3 (2oI 2) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement
of Lucian E. Dervan, Assistant Professor of Law, Southern Illinois University School of Law).
73 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 903, 16 Stat. 745, 805;
BLOOMENTHAL, supra note II, at § 1 o: 1; supra Graph A and accompanying text.
74 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1512(c), 1519 (2012).
75 In Laflerv. Cooper, the Supreme Court stated:
In the end, petitioner's three arguments amount to one general contention: A
fair trial wipes clean any deficient performance by defense counsel during plea
bargaining. That position ignores the reality that criminal justice today is for the
most part a system of pleas, not a system of trials. Ninety-seven percent of federal
convictions and ninety-four percent of state convictions are the result of guilty
pleas.
Lafler v Cooper, 132 S.Ct. 1376, 1388 (2012); see also Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407
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While plea bargaining dates back to English common law, it was not
until the twentieth century that it became a powerful force in the American
criminal justice system. 76 In particular, though appellate courts had rejected
the constitutionality of plea bargaining following the American Civil War,
bargained justice became an invaluable tool of corruption in the early
I900s, as attorneys and judges exchanged money for sentences. 77 It was
into this environment that overcriminalization began to creep as new and
expansive criminal laws were adopted and the Prohibition Era brought
increased enforcement activity.78 By 1930, the overwhelming size of the
criminal dockets left prosecutors with little option other than to utilize plea
bargaining to keep the criminal justice system afloat 79:
[F]ederal prosecutions under the Prohibition Act terminated
in 1930 had become nearly eight times as many as the total
number of all pending federal prosecutions in 1914. In a number
of urban districts the enforcement agencies maintain that the
only practicable way of meeting this situation with the existing
machinery of the federal courts . . . is for the United States
Attorneys to make bargains with defendants or their counsel
whereby defendants plead guilty to minor offenses and escape
with light penalties."'
(zoi 2) (describing the vital role that plea bargaining plays in the criminal justice system). Frye
also cited to a Stanford Law Review article which states, "[defendants] who do take their case
to trial and lose receive longer sentences than even Congress or the prosecutor might think
appropriate, because the longer sentences exist on the books largely for bargaining purposes."
Id. (citing Rachel E. Barkow, Separation of Powers and the Criminal Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 989,
1034 (2006)).
76 See Dervan, supra note 18, at 478 (discussing the rise of plea bargaining in the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries); see also Lucian E. Dervan, Bargained Justice: Plea
Bargaining's Innocence Problem and the Brady Safety-Valve, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 51, 58 (zoi2);
Lucian E. Dervan, Over-Criminalization 2.o: The Symbiotic Relationship Between Plea Bargaining
and Overcriminalization, 7 J.L. ECON. & PoL'v 645,649 (2011); Lucian E. Dervan, The Surprising
Lessons from Plea Bargaining in the Shadow of Terror, 27 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 239, 243-44 (2010).
77 See Albert W. Alschuler, Plea Bargaining and its History, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 19-24
(1979) (describing the use of plea bargaining as a tool of corruption).
78 Id. at 27.
79 See id.; see also Donald A. Dripps, Overcriminalization, Discretion, Waiver: A Survey of
Possible Exit Strategies, 109 PENN ST. L. REV. 1155, 1156-61 (2005) (discussing the relationship
between expanding legal rules and plea bargaining); William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics
of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 519 (2001) (discussing the influence of expansive
laws on the rate of plea bargaining); Ronald E Wright, TrialDistortion andthe End of Innocence
in Federal Criminal Justice, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 79, 129 (2005) ("Changes in federal sentencing
practices during the 198os and 199os increased the certainty and size of the penalty for going
to trial, and mightily influenced the guilty plea and acquittal rates during those times.").
8o Alschuler, supra note 77, at 32 (citing NAT'L COMM'N ON LAW OBSERVANCE &
ENFORCEMENT, REPORT ON THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE PROHIBITION LAWS OF THE UNITED
STATES 56 (19310).
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As evidence of the staggering growth of plea bargaining as a result of
overcriminalization in the early twentieth century, consider that in only
fifty percent of criminal cases resulted in a plea of guilty in 1908, but by
1925 this number had risen to ninety percent.81
The relationship between plea bargaining and overcriminalization
continued to develop over the next hundred years; today, almost ninety-
seven percent of convictions in the federal system result from a plea of
guilty.8" The significance of the relationship between plea bargaining and
overcriminalization in leading us to the current bargained justice system
is demonstrated by consideration of what it would mean for one to exist
without the other:
To illustrate the co-dependent nature of plea bargaining and
overcriminalization, consider what it would mean if there were no
plea bargaining. Novel legal theories and overly-broad statutes
would no longer be tools merely for posturing during charge
and sentence bargaining, but would have to be defended and
affirmed both morally and legally at trial. Further, the significant
costs of prosecuting individuals with creative, tenuous, and
technical charges would not be an abstract possibility used in
determining how great of an incentive to offer a defendant in
return for pleading guilty. Instead, these costs would be a real
consideration in determining whether justice is being served by
bringing a prosecution at all.
Similarly, consider the significant ramifications that would
follow should there no longer be over-criminalization. The law
would be refined and clear regarding conduct for which criminal
liability may attach. Individual benefits, political pressure, and
notoriety would not incentivize the invention of novel legal
theories upon which to base liability where none otherwise
exists, despite the already expansive size of the United States
criminal code. Further, novel legal theories and overly-broad
statutes would not be used to create staggering sentencing
differentials that coerce defendants, even innocent ones, to
falsely confess in return for leniency."
As these comments demonstrate, a symbiotic relationship exists
between plea bargaining and overcriminalization, a relationship that
perpetuates the growth and survival of each. 4 It is into this hole that the
Sarbanes-Oxley reforms may have been swept.
If plea bargaining explains the failures of Sarbanes-Oxley, it is perhaps
because prosecutors did not take the tools this legislation offered to lead
a charge to dramatically increase sentences for all fraud convictions and
significantly increase the total volume of obstruction of justice prosecutions.
81 Id. at 27.
82 Dervan, Over-Criminalization 2.0, supra note 76, at 645-46 (discussing the symbiotic
relationship between plea bargaining and overcriminalization).
83 Id.
84 Id. at 646.
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Perhaps, instead, they may have simply added these weapons to their plea
bargaining arsenals to create ever growing incentives for defendants to
accept plea deals and forgo trials. 5 For those defendants willing to plead
guilty, penalties similar to those faced by defendants during the pre-Enron
era may have remained on the table and may explain the minimal overall
increase in sentences during the 2000s.86 For those who challenged the
government at trial, however, the new weaponry remained available to
secure significantly higher sentences and reinforce the incentives for others
to bargain.87 As such, while the supposed gains from the overcriminalization
contained in Sarbanes-Oxley are elusive, the many and varied negative
consequences flowing from overcriminalization are not. 8 In particular,
the reforms passed by Congress after Enron's collapse may have served to
further perpetuate the symbiotic relationship between overcriminalization
and plea bargaining and allowed for the creation of even greater incentives
to waive one's constitutional right to trial and plead guilty.8 9
As Congress continues to focus on legislative enactments to respond
to crime, and as overcriminalization continues to strengthen the plea
bargaining machine, one must consider whether we have gone too far in
85 Dervan, supra note 18, at 477-78.
Why have financial crimes prosecutions not increased dramatically? Why are
financial criminals receiving only marginally higher sentences? The answer may
be found in the institution some felt was in jeopardy because of post-Enron
reforms; plea bargaining. Prosecutors are not using their weapons in the war on
financial crimes to increase prosecutions or prison sentences, but instead are using
new statutes and the possibility of monumental sentences as tools to encourage
defendants to accept plea agreements that include sentences similar to those
offered before 2OO1. For those who refuse the government's advances, prosecutors
are prepared to use all of their new powers to secure significantly higher sentences
as both a punishment for removing themselves from the plea bargaining machine
and as an example to others who might be considering the same foolish course.
Id. It is impossible to know exactly what happened to the aspirations of Sarbanes-Oxley
in the trenches of the criminal justice system. This article, however, proposes one possible
explanation for the lack of dramatic and significant change resulting from the discussed
amendments to the criminal code.
86 Id. at 477-
87 Id. at 477-78.
88 See Beale, supra note 4, at 749; Podgor, supra note 4.
89 See Darryl K. Brown, Democracy and Decriminalization, 86 TEx. L. REV. 223, 223-24
(2007).
[Overcriminalization] does more than expose ordinary people to criminal
punishment for innocuous behavior. It expands the discretion of prosecutors
to the point of lawlessness because, with broad codes, they can effectively pick
and choose offenders as well as offenses. It aggravates disparities in punishment
because the same conduct is covered by multiple statutes carrying different
sentences. It makes the criminal law incomprehensible to ordinary citizens. All
these things undermine criminal law's legitimacy.
Id.; see also Darryl K. Brown, Prosecutors and Overcriminalization: Thoughts on Political Dynamics
anda Doctrinal Response, 6 OHIo ST. J. CRIM. L. 453, 461 (2009) ("Clearly prosecutors in many
jurisdictions retain the leeway-and sometimes the incentive-to charge and bargain harshly
in ways that exploit overexpansive criminal codes and sentencing laws.").
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creating a system of pleas instead of trials.9 While the relationship between
overcriminalization and plea bargaining drove the rise of bargained justice
during the twentieth century, it was not until 1970 that the U.S. Supreme
Court specifically ruled on the constitutionality of such bargains in the case
of Brady v. United States.9'
Brady involved a defendant who was charged under a federal kidnapping
statute.92 The statute allowed for the death penalty if a defendant was
convicted by a jury.93 As a result, a defendant could avoid the possibility
of receiving the death penalty simply by pleading guilty and avoiding a
jury verdict.94 According to the defendant, the powerful statutory incentive
to plead guilty led him to involuntarily forgo his right to trial. 9s Despite
the previous aversion of U.S. appellate courts to plea bargaining during the
prior century, Brady determined that plea agreements in return for reduced
punishments are permissible.9 6
Importantly, however, Brady inserted a caveat:
For a defendant who sees slight possibility of acquittal, the
advantages of pleading guilty and limiting the probable penalty
are obvious-his exposure is reduced, the correctional processes
can begin immediately, and the practical burdens of a trial are
eliminated. For the State there are also advantages-the more
promptly imposed punishment after an admission of guilt may
more effectively attain the objectives of punishment; and with
90 See Hearing, supra note 72.
In closing, I would like to address one additional issue. While creating additional
overlapping federal criminal statutes and significantly increasing the statutory
maximum penalties for offenses related to prescription drug offenses may
not result in greater deterrence of potential offenders or significantly increase
sentences for those convicted, such legislation will perpetuate the phenomenon of
overcriminalization and with it the continued deterioration of our constitutionally
protected right to trial by jury.
Id.; see also Neal K. Katyal, Deterrence's Difficulty, 95 MicH. L. REv. 2385, 2389-90 (1997).
A few law and economics scholars, however, noted that Becker missed a crucial
variable for optimality: marginal deterrence. The idea is essentially the problem
of cliffs -exacting equal penalties for crimes of lesser and greater magnitude leads
to crimes of greater magnitude. As its primary exponent, George Stigler, put it,
"[i]f the thief has his hand cut off for taking five dollars, he had just as well take
$5,000." Stigler's insight tracked that of the eighteenth--century Italian theorist
Cesare Beccaria, who argued: "If an equal punishment is laid down for two crimes
which damage society unequally, men will not have a stronger deterrent against
committing the greater crime if they find it more advantageous to do so." Jeremy
Bentham made a similar move as well, arguing that the goal of a sanction is "to
induce a man to choose always the least mischievous of two offences; therefore
[wihere two offences come in competition, the punishment for the greater offence
must be sufficient to induce a man to prefer the less."
Id. at 2389-o.
91 See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
92 Id. at 743.
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 Id. at 744.
96 Id. at 751.
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the avoidance of trial, scarce judicial and prosecutorial resources
are conserved for those cases in which there is a substantial issue of the
defendant's guilt or in which there is substantial doubt that the State can
sustain its burden of proof 91
According to the Court, then, plea bargaining was to be reserved for
those instances where the defendant sought a small benefit in return for
preserving judicial and prosecutorial resources in clear cases of guilt. If plea
bargaining became excessively powerful, however, the Court warned that
it might exceed the bounds of the Constitution and strip defendants of a
meaningful decision regarding whether to waive their right to trial by jury98 :
This is not to say that guilty plea convictions hold no hazard
for the innocent or that the methods of taking guilty pleas
presently employed in this country are necessarily valid in all
respects. This mode of conviction is no more foolproof than
full trials to the court or to the jury. Accordingly, we take great
precautions against unsound results, and we should continue to
do so, whether conviction is by plea or by trial. We would have
serious doubts about this case if the encouragement increased
the likelihood that defendants, advised by competent counsel,
would falsely condemn themselves. 99
As overcriminalization by Congress continues to perpetuate the dominance
and the persuasive power of plea bargaining, the Supreme Court's concerns
may have materialized. While the possibility of plea bargaining's innocence
problem has been recognized for decades, new empirical evidence
regarding the susceptibility of the innocent to plea bargaining brings this
issue once again to the forefront.
A recent study of university students, administered by myself and a
colleague, suggests that plea bargaining may have an inherent innocence
problem. Our results call into question the Brady decision's assumptions
regarding the persuasive power of plea bargaining.' 0 Subjects in the study
97 Id. at 752 (emphasis added).
98 See id. at 758.
99 Id. at 757-58; see also Stephanos Bibas, Harmonizing Substantive-Criminal-Law Values
and Criminal Procedure: The Case of Alford and Nolo Contendere Pleas, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 136 1,
1382 (2003) ("Even if innocent defendants want to plead guilty, the law should not go out
of its way to promote these unjust results."); Andrew D. Leipold, How the Pretrial Process
Contributes to Wrongul Convictions, 42 AM. CR151. L. REV. 1123, I 158 (2005) (supporting Bibas'
statements regarding innocent defendants and plea bargaining).
ioo See Lucian E. Dervan & Vanessa A. Edkins, The Innocent Defendant's Dilemma: An
Innovative Empirical Study of Plea Bargaining's Innocence Problem, i03 J. CRIm. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
I (2013). The study was administered to eighty-two students. Six students were removed
from the study because of suspicion as to the study's actual focus, an inability to complete
the study, or a refusal to assist the confederate when asked to render assistance in answering
the questions. Thus, seventy-six participants remained. Of this number, thirty-one indicated
they were female and forty-five indicated they were male. Of the study population, 52.6%
identified as Caucasian, 2I.I% identified as African-American, 13.2% identified as Hispanic,
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agreed to participate in a project they believed was designed to test the
differences between individual and group problem solving.101 As such, the
subjects were placed in a room with another student, who, unbeknownst
to the subject, was a confederate working with the researchers."' 2 The
subject and the confederate were then instructed that they could not assist
each other during the individual problem-solving portion of the project.103
Nevertheless, in roughly half of the cases, the confederate asked for and
received assistance from the subject. °4 This was considered "cheating" for
purposes of the study."5 After the subject and the confederate completed
the problem solving project, they were separated and, regardless of whether
the individual had in fact assisted the confederate in cheating, the subject
was offered a "plea" in return for "pleading guilty" to the alleged offense. 0 6
The first offer to the participant was a bargain. 0 7 If the individual
pleaded guilty to the alleged offense, he or she would have to admit
the conduct and forego his or her compensation for participating in the
experiment.108 All of the participants were informed that those refusing
the "deal" would have the case referred to the school's Academic Review
Board ("ARB").1°9 The ARB was described to the participants as a group
of ten to twelve faculty and staff members responsible for hearing such
matters and determining whether an accused was guilty.- ° Further, the
5.3% identified as Asian, and 7.9% identified as "Other." Forty-eight students identified
themselves as U.S. citizens, while twenty-eight students identified themselves as non-U.S.
citizens.
1oi Id. at 28.
102 Id. at 3o n.169.
103 See id. The research script required the research assistants to make the following
statement during the introduction:
We are studying the performance of individuals versus groups on logic problems.
You will be given three logic problems to work through together and then three
problems to work through on your own. It is very important that you work on the
individual problems alone. You have 15 minutes for each set of problems. Even if
you run out of time, you must circle an answer for each question. First, you'll be
working on the group problems. I will leave the room and be back in 15 minutes.
If you finish before that time, one of you can duck your head out the door and let
me know.
Id.
104 Id. at 29.
105 See id. It is worth noting that all but two study participants approached by the
confederate to offer assistance violated the requirement that each student work alone. The
two students who refused to offer assistance were removed from the study. Id. n. 168.
io6 Id. at 31-33. Importantly, the individual offering the subjects the "plea" was unaware
at the time whether the individual had, in fact, "cheated." Id. at 30.
107 Id. at 32.
o8 Id. at 31 ("This particular offer was made to all study participants and was constructed
to be akin to an offer of probation or time served in the actual criminal justice system.").
109 Id. at 32.
So Id.
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ARB was described in terms similar to a traditional criminal court, where
the participant would have the opportunity to explain his or her version of
events, present evidence, and argue for his or her innocence.'" Finally, to
offer the participant some background information about the fictional ARB
similar to that which might be offered by counsel in an actual criminal case,
the participant was informed that "the majority of students, like 80-9o%,
are usually found guilty" before the ARB." 2 This statistic was utilized
because it represents the percentage of cases that result in verdicts of guilt
after trial in the U.S. criminal justice system." 3
The research assistant then offered the accused participant one of two
different versions of what would occur if the ARB found him or her guilty.II4
In roughly half of the cases, the research assistant informed the participant
that, if found guilty after trial before the ARB, he or she would lose his or
her compensation, his or her faculty advisor would be notified, and he or
she would have to enroll in nine hours of ethics training."- In roughly the
other half of cases, the research assistant informed the participant that, if
found guilty after trial before the ARB, he or she would lose his or her
compensation, his or her faculty advisor would be notified, and he or she
would have to enroll in a three credit-hour seminar that met throughout
the semester." 6 Both courses were described as free of charge, but each
was explained as requiring mandatory attendance and completion of a
final examination."7 Placed in a similar position to a criminal defendant
weighing his or her options, regardless of guilt or innocence and in the
face of a sentencing differential, the study subjects contemplated their
choices.", 8
The results of the study were significant, though perhaps not
surprising. Almost nine out of ten "guilty" subjects accepted the "deal"
and pleaded guilty."'9 Slightly less than six out of ten innocent defendants
falsely confessed to something they had not done in return for the same
incentives.I"'
iii Id.
112 Id.
113 Id.
114 Id. at 32-33 .
115 Id.
1i6 Id. at 32.
117 Id. at 32-33.
118 See id. at 33 ("While academic discipline is not precisely equivalent to traditional
criminal penalties, the anxiety experienced by students anticipating punishment is similar
in form, if not intensity, to the anxiety experienced by an individual charged with a criminal
offense.").
i19 Seeid. at34.
120 See id. ("We conducted a three-way log-linear analysis to test the effects of guilt
(guilt vs. innocence) and type of sanction (lenient vs. harsh) on the participant's decision
to accept the plea bargain. The highest order interaction (guilt x sanction x plea) was not
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Graph F:
Percentage of Students by Condition (Guilty or Innocent)
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This evidence of plea bargaining's innocence problem reveals that the
Supreme Court was wrong in 1970 when it assumed innocent defendants
would not falsely confess in the face of an offered bargain.'' With this in
mind, the symbiotic relationship between overcriminalization and plea
bargaining is especially problematic. This is particularly so given that the
statutes in question raised statutory maximums and created overlapping,
broad federal statutes in already-criminalized areas, yet failed to achieve
their intended enforcement objectives.
significant, X2 (i, N = 76) = o.z6, p = o.61. What was significant was the interaction between
guilt and plea, X2 (I, N= 76) = 10.95,P < o.o. To break down this effect, a separate chi-square
test was performed looking at guilt and plea, collapsed across type of sanction. Applying the
continuity correction for a 2 X 2 contingency table, there was a significant effect of guilt, x, (I,
N= 76) = 8.63,p < o.o, with the odds ratio indicating that those who were guilty were 6.38
times more likely to accept a plea than those who were innocent,").
1z See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 758 (1970).
10.8%
43.6%
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CONCLUSION
A preliminary review of data regarding the sentences received by
mail and wire fraud defendants and the number of obstruction of justice
prosecutions since the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley suggests that little
has changed significantly as a result of these legislative enactments."' 2
Defendants convicted of mail and wire fraud offenses are receiving average
sentences that are higher than during the pre-Sarbanes-Oxley period, but
the observed increases in mean and median prison sentences for fraud are
likely attributable to forces other than post-Enron statutory reforms.12 3
Further, the actual number of individuals charged with obstruction of
justice as their most significant offense remains small, despite the creation
of two new federal statutes. 114 In fact, when compared with all federal
prosecutions during the same period, the government's focus on obstruction
of justice appears to have diminished since the collapse of Enron."5 These
failings, and the likely resulting failure to deter future criminality through
these reforms, may be due, at least in part, to plea bargaining-a system
that uses such legislative enactments for its own ends rather than those of
the legislature.
Based on these findings, the "justifications" advanced by some
for ignoring the negative consequences that naturally flow from the
overcriminalization found in Sarbanes-Oxley and examined in this article
are hollow and unconvincing. These justifications rely on false assumptions
regarding the relationship between increased statutory maximums,
increased punishments for individuals, the relationship between expanding
prosecutorial arsenals in areas already criminalized, and increased levels of
enforcement. 26 While the overcriminalization found in Sarbanes-Oxley
may not result in significantly longer sentences, dramatically increased
enforcement actions, or greater deterrence of potential offenders, such
legislation does perpetuate the phenomenon of overcriminalization and
with it the continued deterioration of our constitutionally protected right
to trial by jury.
Today, almost ninety-seven percent of criminal convictions in the
federal system are resolved through a plea of guilty."2 7 As the number,
breadth, and sentencing severity of federal criminal statutes continue to
increase through overcriminalization, prosecutors gain increased ability to
create overwhelming incentives for defendants to waive their constitutional
122 See supra Graphs A, D and accompanying text.
123 See supra Part II.
124 See supra PART I and Graph D (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 1512(c), 1519 (2012)).
125 See supra Graphs C, E and accompanying text.
126 See supra Part IV
127 See Dervan, Over-Cnminalization 2.o: The Symbiotic Relationship Between Plea
Bargaining and Overcriminalization, supra note 76, at 645.
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right to a trial by jury and plead guilty. The symbiotic relationship between
overcriminalization and plea bargaining has led us to our current state and
created an environment in which we have jeopardized the accuracy of our
criminal justice system in favor of speed and convenience. We found that
more than half of the innocent participants in our study falsely admitted
guilt in return for a perceived benefit.1 8 As overcriminalization continues
to create incentives that make plea bargaining so prevalent and powerful,
one must ask what constitutional price is being paid when Congress creates
yet another law or increases yet another statutory maximum where, despite
the intent of Congress in passing them, these reforms appear ineffective at
actually achieving their primary goal of deterrence.
i28 See supra Graph F.
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